Silencing Talk about Race: Why Arizona\u27s Prohibition of Ethnic Studies Violates Equality by Medina, M. Isabel
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 45
Number 1 Fall 2017 Article 3
1-1-2017
Silencing Talk about Race: Why Arizona's
Prohibition of Ethnic Studies Violates Equality
M. Isabel Medina
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
M. Isabel Medina, Silencing Talk about Race: Why Arizona's Prohibition of Ethnic Studies Violates Equality, 45 Hastings Const. L.Q. 47
(2017).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol45/iss1/3
Silencing Talk About Race: Why Arizona's
Prohibition of Ethnic Studies Violates Equality
by M. ISABEL MEDINA*
I see a big difference because from the ethnic studies classes you're
getting both perspectives of the history. In the regular studies like
English or social studies, you're just getting the one perspective
that's in the book. In the MAS you're getting what's in the book but
you're also getting background information on how other places
contributed to it.
Ignorance is strength.2
- George Orwell
Introduction
Multiethnic, racial, or ethnic studies were one of the mechanisms
developed by schools as a remedy in school desegregation cases in the 1970s,
* Ferris Family Distinguished Professor of Law, Loyola University New Orleans College
of Law. Thanks to the participants of "Perspectives on Affirmative Action and Diversity" at the
2016 Law and Society Association Conference, in particular Karen Miksch, participants at the Mid-
American Jesuit Faculty Program at Marquette University Law School, the 2014 Immigration
Professors Law Workshop at Irvine, the 2013 Loyola Chicago Constitutional Law Conference, in
particular, Juan Perea, and to the participants of the 2013 SESW People of Color Legal Scholarship
Conference at the University of Arkansas William H. Bowen School of Law, in particular George
Martinez for very helpful comments and suggestions. I am indebted to Robert Chang, Richard
Delgado, and Rachel Moran. Special thanks to Brian Huddleston. All errors are my own.
1. MAS participant, Cambium Audit Report, Curriculum Audit of the Mexican American
Studies Department Tucson Unified School District, May 2, 2011, at 33, available as Exhibit C to
Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint [hereinafter "Cambium Report"]. The Arizona
Superintendent of Education commissioned the Cambium Report as part of his investigation into
the Mexican American Studies program at Tucson High School.
2. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 4 (Plume 2003). In Orwell's 1984, "ignorance is strength" is
one of three slogans adhered to by the governing party. The other two are "war is peace" and
"freedom is slavery." The slogans reflect the society's approach to language, "newspeak," which
reinterprets terms to mean their exact opposite.
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when the United States Supreme Court stymied other mechanisms for
stimulating racial and ethnic diversity in public schools.3 The Court ruled
that states could not fashion interdistrict or multi-district remedies unless all
of the districts involved had been found to violate the Equal Protection
Clause.4 Thus, inner city school districts, abandoned in substantial numbers
by white families and left with majority minority racial populations, could
not attempt to desegregate by reaching out to suburban white populations.
School districts found to be guilty of violating students' Equal Protection
rights, instead, could pursue alternative, resource-driven measures that could
take race into account in curriculum, student assignment, and teacher
training. Ethnic or racial studies are an example of this type of measure.
Race conscious courses came into being at the height of the Civil Rights
era. At the heart of Brown v. Board of Education's mandate that "separate
educational facilities are inherently unequal"5 was recognition that racially
segregated education functioned to perpetuate inequality of the races with
the superiority of the white race the predominant and established norm.
Racially segregated public education represented enforcement and continued
entrenchment of the norm by educating generations of children to absorb,
accept, and extend the norm. The norm of white supremacy was embedded
throughout the pre-Brown school curriculum, and reflected in literature,
historiography, mathematics, and sciences as well as pedagogical
methodology, in ways that scholars are still analyzing. White supremacy
rested on a particular telling of history; a particular construction of the United
States and U.S. society, which implicitly and explicitly called for
"ignorance" about facts or truths in the country's history that challenged the
norm. This kind of ignorance masquerades as strength in the world of
George Orwell's 1984, where historical facts or narratives are easily and
painlessly changed to suit the moment's political necessities. Brown opened
the door to truth-telling about slavery, race, and segregation in school
classrooms. School districts turned to ethnic studies programs, designed to
recognize the contributions of the "inferior" races or ethnic groups and tell a
more complete truth about U.S. history and U.S. society than had been
accepted pre-Brown.
3. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (Milliken I).
4. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (Milliken II).
5. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) ("We conclude that in the field of public
education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are
inherently unequal.").
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Ethnic studies, or "culturally relevant pedagogy," have proved
successful at bridging educational gaps between minority students and their
white cohorts. 6 Black and Hispanic eighth-grade students are significantly
behind their white peers in mathematics; are substantially overrepresented
among students with learning disabilities; and have double the dropout rates
than white students.7 However, a recent Stanford study concluded that the
ethnic studies program in use in some San Francisco high schools increased
student attendance significantly, student grade point average by 1.4 grade
points, and the number of credits earned.8
Despite their success with student populations, ethnic programs have
proved controversial because of their focus on race. In 2010, the state of
Arizona enacted a statute prohibiting such programs.9 Subsequently, the
state superintendent of education ordered the dismantling of the Tucson
Unified School District No. 1's Mexican-American Studies ("MAS") ethnic
or "race related" program because it violated the statute.10 Arizona justified
its actions on the grounds that the programs promoted racial hatred." The
state superintendent of education contended that the MAS program
constituted racist or hate speech. A coalition of teachers, parents and
students challenged the statute and the order dismantling the MAS program
on the grounds that they violated the First Amendment and Equal Protection
Clause of the federal Constitution. Although the litigation has been
successful in part, the MAS program ceased to exist. 12 The success of the
6. Thomas Dee & Emily Penner, The Causal Effects of Cultural Relevance: Evidence from
an Ethnic Studies Curriculum (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21865, 2016).
7. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, 2015 NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF EDUCATIONAL
PROGRESS (2017); See SUSAN AUD ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, NCES 2010-013,
STATUS AND TRENDS IN THE EDUCATION OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC GROUPS (2010); MARIE C.
STETSER & ROBERT STWLWELL, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, NCES 2014-391, PUBLIC
HIGH SCHOOL FOUR-YEAR ON-TIME GRADUATION RATES AND EVENT DROPOUT RATES: SCHOOL
YEARS 2010-11 AND 2011-12 (2010).
8. Dee & Penner, supra note 6, at 3.
9. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-112 (2011).
10. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-112 (2011); see infra Section 5, at notes 125-153. See
also Richard Delgado, Precious Knowledge: State Bans on Ethnic Studies, Book Traffickers
(Librotraficantes), and a New Type of Race Trial, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1513, 1523 (2013); Lupe S.
Salinas, Arizona's Desire to Eliminate Ethnic Studies Programs: A Time to Take the "Pill" and to
Engage Latino Students in Critical Education About Their History, 14 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 301,
311 (2011).
11. Id.
12. See Acosta v. Huppenthal, 2013 WL 871892 (D. Ariz. Mar. 8, 2013), aff'g in part, rev'd
in part, and remanded for trial, Arce v. Douglas, 793 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 2015). The case went to
trial in July 2017. The district court issued a decision on August 22, 2017, while this article was in
production. The court issued a judgment as to liability for the plaintiffs on the grounds that the
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effort to dismantle the MAS program raises questions about the extent to which
these kinds of programs continue to be a viable mechanism for broadening their
students' awareness and perspective of history, race, ethnicity, and self-identity,
and a part of the Fourteenth Amendment's essential guarantee of equality,
beyond a narrower role as a desegregation remedy.
Particularly in states with significant minority ethnic populations, like
Arizona, Texas, and California, ethnic studies programs are a way of
debunking stereotypes, enhancing critical learning skills, improving
understanding among different ethnic groups, and promoting greater national
unity. Developments in Equal Protection law, however, adopting a more
tolerant view of when public educational institutions may prohibit the use of
race or ethnicity as the defining characteristic of a program may encourage
states to prohibit or limit this type of program. While there may be no
constitutional command to offer such programs, courts should rigorously
scrutinize their statutory prohibition. There are few, if any, legitimate
reasons to prohibit ethnic studies programs in public schools.
This Article examines the development and function of ethnic studies,
their role as a desegregation remedy and in crafting a more accurate and
informed view of history. This Article contends that ethnic studies are a
vibrant and vital educational tool to explore and challenge established
historical and cultural orthodoxies that adversely affect formation of
individual and group identity, and encourage and develop critical thinking
about race and ethnicity in student populations. The Article explains how
the Court's intolerance for the use of race conscious measures, even as
desegregation remedies, renders ethnic studies programs a race conscious
method available to public school districts to enhance student diversity and
promote multiracial understanding and acceptance. Paradoxically, the
Court's tolerance for state-initiated bans on race conscious measures reflects
its adherence to color blindness or race neutrality as a positive constitutional
value. The Court's approach frames as neutral initiatives that treat all races
or ethnicities alike, regardless of their impact on minority races or of the
overt or covert amount of racism in the community that produced the
initiatives. In this framing, neutrality functions to hide or protect racism and
allows courts to avoid identifying whether the political initiative furthers
equality between the races or continues to subordinate one race or ethnicity.
statute and the enforcement action against the MAS program were motivated by invidious racial
animus. Memorandum of Decision, Gonzalez v. Douglas, No. CV 10-623 TUC AWT, D. Ariz.
Aug. 22, 2017. The court did not decide the question of remedies for the constitutional violation,
however, and parties were invited to file remedy briefs with the court. Id. Where practical, some
of the citations in the piece were changed to reflect the district court's opinion.
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This Article contends that state efforts to prohibit ethnic studies programs
are constitutionally infirm and should engage strict scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause because they classify and prohibit curricular content and
offerings on the basis of race or ethnicity to silence and subordinate non-
majority racial and ethnic groups. Statutes like Arizona's, on their face,
promote the majority racial and ethnic group and silence others.
I. The Development of Cultural/Ethnic/Multiethnic Studies:
A Race Conscious History
That history and knowledge of culture is colored by the historian's or
narrator's perspective and methodology is a principle accepted in
historiography.13 Ethnic studies are designed to enrich our understanding of
historical and other narratives by acknowledging and increasing the
perspectives that are presented to primary and secondary students to include
a racial or multiracial perspective. History is an evolving, continually
revisited and rewritten narrative, and the use of ethnic studies is not
dependent on a particular historical view or period. That ethnic studies
became prevalent during the Civil Rights Era, in the wake of Brown v. Board
of Education, does not render them irrelevant today. On the contrary, the
need for ethnic studies programs and classes remains in a world order that
not only relieves the states and federal government from addressing stark
disparities in the impact of governmental measures on minority groups, but
sharply limits their ability to undertake them. 14
Ethnic studies programs present subject matter through a particular
ethnic or racial perspective. They plainly identify, acknowledge, and explore
race and ethnicity. This is what makes the programs race conscious. They
are designed to acknowledge and celebrate the contributions of marginalized
or subordinated groups, such as Native Americans, African-Americans,
women, Latina/os, the Japanese, the Chinese, and others, to the dominant
national narrative that traditionally has ignored or minimized how race,
ethnicity and gender function in society. Ethnic studies may be used across
disciplines to teach a variety of subject matter areas. Although designed
13. KEITH JENKINS, RE-THINKING HISTORY (Routledge 1991). See generally E.H. CARR,
WHAT Is HISTORY? (Knopf 1963); DAVID LOWENTHAL, THE PAST IS A FOREIGN COUNTRY
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1985); HAYDEN WHITE, TROPICS OF DISCOURSE (Johns Hopkins Univ.
Press 1978). But see GEOFFREY R. ELTON, THE PRACTICE OF HISTORY (Fontana 1969).
14. See, e.g., Schuette v. Coal. to Def. Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014), Shelby
Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013), and Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411
(2013).
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from a particular ethnic or racial perspective, ethnic studies enrich the
educational experience of students from all racial or ethnic backgrounds.
In one sense, however, ethnic studies are not race conscious measures.
Although race and ethnicity are used to make decisions about curriculum and
pedagogy, race, and ethnicity are not used to make decisions about individual
students. As long as they are offered to all students, without regard to the
student's own individual racial or ethnic identity, ethnic studies programs do
not violate or challenge the equality principle. When they are offered to both
white and nonwhite students, ethnic studies programs do not distribute
burdens or benefits on the basis of individual racial or ethnic classifications.
Instead, these programs facilitate "exposure to widely diverse people,
cultures, ideas, and viewpoints; and create opportunity for all students, not
just students of a particular race or ethnicity."15 Ethnic studies programs can
enhance individual students' sense of identity, generate greater
understanding of ethnic groups, and generate greater individual awareness
of the commonality, not just the differences, in human beings. 16
Ethnic studies programs were developed in the latter part of the
twentieth century as part of the national effort to desegregate public
education in the United States, and to acknowledge and counterbalance the
dominance of a "white" or "Euro-centric" perspective across a wide-range
of disciplines. Ethnic studies developed both in the context of higher
education and secondary education. In higher education, they emerged as
departments or majors in African-American studies,17 Asian studies,18 and
Latina/o studies. 19 Higher education developed race or ethnic studies in
15. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
16. CHRISTINE E. SLEETER, NAT'L EDUC. Ass'N, THE ACADEMIC AND SOCIAL VALUE OF
ETHNIC STUDIES: A RESEARCH REVIEW vii-viii (2011).
17. See, e.g., The Dep't of African American Studies at Syracuse Univ., http://aas.syr.edu;
African American Studies at Penn State, http://afam.1a.psu.edu; Dep't of African American Studies
at Northwestern Univ., http://www.afam.northwestern.edu; African & African Diaspora Studies at
Tulane Univ., http://tulane.edulliberal-arts/african-and-african-diaspora-studies/; Duke African &
African American Studies, http://aaas.duke.edu; Dep't of African American Studies at Yale Univ.,
http://afamstudies.yale.edu; African-American Studies at Columbia Univ. Graduate Sch. of Arts
and Sciences, https:Ilgsas.columbia.edu/degree-programs/admissions.
18. See, e.g., Asian Studies at the Florida State Univ., http://coss.fsu.edu/inaprog/programs/
undergraduate/asian; Dep't of Asian Studies at Williams Coll., http://asian-studies.williams.edu;
Asian Studies at Tulane Univ., http://tulane.edulliberal-arts/asian-studies/courses.cfm; Loyola
Univ. New Orleans, http://interdisciplinary.loyno.edulasianstudies. See also The Ass'n for Asian
Studies, https://www.asian-studies.org.
19. See, e.g., Dep't of American Culture Latinalo Studies at the Univ. of Michigan,
http://www.lsa.umich.edu/latina; Dep't of Latina/Latino Studies at the Univ. of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, http://www.ls.illinois.edu; Latina and Latino Studies at Northwestern Univ.,
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response to student demand and protest. In 1968, students at San Francisco
State engaged in a five-month strike that generated the first College of
Ethnic Studies in the nation. 20  Led by a coalition of student groups
including the Black Student Union, Chicano, Latino and Asian-American
groups, known as the Third World Liberation Front, and supported by
students, faculty, and community activists, the protest is the longest
campus strike in United States history. By 1978, 439 colleges in the
country offered a total of 8,805 ethnic studies courses.21 In higher
education, ethnic studies are vibrant but controversial academic disciplines
that generate substantial scholarly interest. 22
Ethnic studies programs in public primary or secondary schools are
not that common throughout the United States.23 They were one of many
mechanisms adopted by school districts found to have operated racially
separate school systems, as part of their desegregation plans designed to
remedy the Equal Protection violations.24 They received scholarly
attention in the 1990s, in view of the Supreme Court's retrenchment
towards race conscious remedies.25 Their use as remedies in Equal
Protection litigation continues to be valid, and presumably would not be
affected by statutes like Arizona's. 26
http://www.latinostudies.northwestern.edu; Latinalo Studies at Williams Coll., http://latino-
studies.williams.edu; and Latino Studies Program at Cornell Univ., http://latino.cornell.edu.
20. RODOLFO F. ACUNA, THE MAKING OF CHICANA/O STUDIES: IN THE TRENCHES OF
ACADEME (Rugters Univ. Press 2011). See Karen Umemoto, "On Strike!" San Francisco State
College Strike, 1968-69: The Role ofAsian American Students, 15 AMERASIA 3-41 (1989).
21. Campus Commemorates 1968 Student-led Strike, SF STATE NEWS (Sept. 22, 2008),
http://www.sfsu.edu/news/2008/fall/8.html (citing to a 1981 Educ. Res. Info. Ctr. report).
22. E.g., Journal of Black Studies, Journal of African American Studies, African American
Review, African American Review (formerly Black American Literature Forum); Journal of
Latina/o Psychology, Latino Studies, Chicano/a - Latino/a Law Review, Latino Journal; Journal
of Asian Studies, International Journal of Asian Studies, Journal of East Asian Studies. See
COLOR-LINE TO BORDERLANDS: THE MATRIX OF AMERICAN ETHNIC STUDIES 103-12 (Johnnella
E. Butler ed., Univ. of Wash. Press 2001).
23. SLEETER, supra note 16, at 6-7.
24. The Tucson Unified School District litigation is an example of the first desegregation
plan approved by the court, which included an African American Studies Department and
instruction in Black Studies.
25. See, e.g., Sonia R. Jarvis, Brown and the Afrocentric Curriculum, 101 YALE L.J. 1285
(1992).
26. Throughout, the term "race conscious remedies" refers to remedies that courts may order
in equal protection litigation; the term "race conscious measures" refers to measures that may be
constitutionally prohibited when school districts adopt them voluntarily, like student assignment
plans, and measures, like ethnic studies programs, that school districts may adopt voluntarily that
do not directly lead to differences in individual treatment.
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Their absence may reflect a number of factors. Current national
educational policy emphasizes testing and basic competency in core areas.
School districts seeking to meet national standards may be deterred from
pursuing more specialized or inclusive perspectives. In addition, school
districts have been adversely affected by the weakness of the national
economy; they have faced cuts to their resources that make it difficult to
pursue ethnic studies. Further, although the rise of charter schools could
facilitate an ethnic studies pedagogy or curriculum, in practice that has not
developed either because of the stress on standards or because charters have
opted to identify themselves in other ways, by stressing mathematics and
science, for example.2 7 The absence of ethnic studies, however, may simply
reflect the Euro-white centric nature of the American educational system,
and adherence to the view that there is a single, objective, neutral, correct
historical (or other) narrative.
A significant benefit of ethnic studies programs to all public school
students may be to offset the Euro-American bias still predominant in the
primary and secondary school curriculum. 28 By naming, acknowledging,
and celebrating the accomplishments and impact of other, marginalized
groups to the dominant narrative in areas such as history, the sciences,
literature, and mathematics, ethnic studies programs provide young students
who are members of the marginalized group positive role models to emulate
and a positive sense of cultural or ethnic identity. These positive outcomes
are not based on hatred for others but on the accomplishments of individuals
that are part of the group, something that the dominant racial or ethnic group
enjoys by virtue of its own position in the social hierarchy. Ethnic studies
benefit members of the dominant social group as well because they enrich
their own understanding of the complexity of the social order, affording them
a fuller, more descriptive and more accurate account of the subject.
Although they began in higher education, they have been used as early as
pre-kindergarten.
27. In New Orleans, a city whose public education system has become almost all charter, most of
the schools have opted to emphasize a subject matter focus, like technology or science, or simply continue
a traditional college prep curriculum. A list of New Orleans charter schools is available at
https://lacharterschools.org/about-charter-schools/find-a-charter-school/. See Danielle Dreilinger, New
Orleans Could Get 5 New Charter Schools, Including Audubon Expansion, TIMES-PICAYUNE (May 24,
2017) http://www.nola.comleducationlindex.ssf/2017/05/opsb charter rec ommendations.html. See
Andrea Gabor, The Myth of the New Orleans School Makeover, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/23/opinion/sunday/the-myth-of-the-new-orleans-school-
makeover.html (criticizing the functioning of the charter school system in New Orleans).
28. See generally ACUNA, supra note 20.
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At least two types of ethnic studies program are used in primary and
secondary education in the United States: programs designed for students of
color and programs designed for groups that include white students. 29 Both
kinds of programs are offered to white students and to students of color.
Some programs are integrated into the curriculum and some are offered as
stand-alone programs.
The primary benefit of ethnic studies programs may be to eradicate the
disparities in achievement and graduation rates between black and Hispanic
student populations and their white peers. Research into the effectiveness of
ethnic studies programs in primary and secondary schools finds that
programs that have been designed specifically for students of color have a
positive impact on them, including: high levels of student engagement,
improvement in literacy skills, achievement, and attitudes towards
learning.30 Programs that are designed for groups that include white students
produce higher levels of thinking, particularly for white students.3 1 More
recent research shows a causal effect between ethnic studies courses and
pedagogy and improvements in academic achievements for at-risk students.
The Stanford study of San Francisco public high schools found that ES
participation "increased student attendance . . . by 21 percentage points,
cumulative ninth-grade GPA by 1.4 grade points, and credits earned by 23
credits." 32 The results led the researchers to conclude, "participation in the
course reduced the probability of dropping out in addition to possibly
improving the performance of enrolled students."3 3
In institutions of higher learning, critics have claimed that ethnic studies
programs are that these programs are not a rigorous enough discipline and
produce weak scholarship, that they are divisive and undermine national
unity, and that they are of interest only to members of the particular ethnic
group.34 Some might suggest that they are irrelevant or unnecessary in a
29. SLEETER, supra note 16, at 7-19.
30. Id. at 8-16.
31. Id. at 16-19.
32. Dee & Penner, supra note 6, at 3. The GPA gains were larger for boys than for girls, and
were higher in math and science than in English language arts. See also SLEETER, supra note 16,
at 16-19.
33. Dee & Penner, supra note 6, at 3.
34. See Evelyn Hu-DeHart, The History, Development and Future of Ethnic Studies, 75 THE
PHI DELTA KAPPAN 50-54 (1993); Evelyn Hu-DeHart, Ethnic Studies in U.S. Higher Education:
The State of the Discipline, 75 THE PHI DELTA KAPPAN 1, 50-54, Sept. 1993; COLOR-LINE TO
BORDERLANDS: THE MATRIX OF AMERICAN ETHNIC STUDIES, supra note 22; Statement on the
Value of Ethnic Studies Programs, MODERN LANGUAGE Ass'N, https://www.mla.org/statement
val ethnic studies.
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society where race is no longer a barrier to achieving positions of power,
Similar criticisms are leveled at ethnic studies programs in primary and
secondary schools.35 Although ethnic studies programs continue to be
controversial in higher education, current legal doctrine respects the
discretion and autonomy of teachers and educational institutions in higher
education to make determinations as to which areas of studies they will
promote or offer to their students, either under the First or Fourteenth
Amendments. Academic faculties in higher education enjoy academic
freedom rights, which protect the right to exercise discretion in determining
how and what they teach. Universities and colleges similarly enjoy
deference even when they are publicly funded, and the power of state
legislatures to prescribe or proscribe curricular choices is limited.36
The law applied to secondary education, however, has developed a
different understanding of the discretion and autonomy teachers, school
districts, and state legislatures enjoy under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Courts have tended to circumscribe the degree of autonomy
and discretion secondary education teachers enjoy, and have recognized, to
some extent, the power of the state to inculcate values and proscribe and
prescribe curricular choices for public schools.37 When school districts make
voluntary curricular choices in which race has some weight, those decisions
are analyzed not under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but under the First Amendment. The First Amendment
analysis looks at institutional speech rights, teachers' academic freedom, and
students' right to know-all of which receive less protection in the school
setting. As a result, the curriculum may fall prey to political processes that
leave students of color vulnerable to backlash without ever violating their
First Amendment rights. It becomes important, then, to examine the
importance of these programs to primary and secondary education
academically, and the role that they continue to play in ensuring that public
schools not discriminate against students on the basis of race or ethnicity.
Recent Supreme Court opinions suggest that the Court views the United
States as a society that has successfully dealt with the problem of race,
35. Dee & Penner, supra note 6, at 6-7.
36. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 324-29 (2003) ("We have long recognized that, given
the important purpose of public education and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought
associated with the university environment, universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional
tradition.") (citations omitted).
37. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bd. of Edu. v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853 (1982); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Epperson v. Ark.,
393 U.S. 97 (1968); Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
56 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 45:1
SLENCING TALK ABOUT RACE
viewed through the prisms of slavery and segregation, the goal at the heart
of Brown v. Board of Education and its progeny. 38 For example, in the area
of voting rights, a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court in Shelby County v.
Holder concluded that continuing to require pre-clearance of certain states
chosen by reference to a formula adopted in the Civil Rights era was
unconstitutional because it ignored current conditions, which in the view of
the Court showed that there is no widespread or flagrant discrimination by
the relevant states.
A year later, in 2014, in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative
Action, the Court upheld a state referendum in Michigan that prohibited the
use of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in public employment,
public education, or public contracting. 39 Yet, it was the University of
Michigan, the state's flagship school, which had produced the cases that led
the Court to uphold the use of race as one of many factors in achieving the
interest of diversity in higher education. Michigan voters, in essence,
rejected the Court's earlier holding in Grutter v. Bollinger,40 and thereafter
adopted a state constitutional amendment that banned the University from
using race conscious measures in admissions.4 1 In Schuette, a badly
splintered Court upheld the constitutional amendment with no opinion
drawing a majority of justices, but a majority rejecting a view of the
amendment as a race-based measure that required strict scrutiny.4 2 Rather,
38. See Shelby County, Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); M. Isabel Medina, The
Missing and Misplaced History in Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder - Through the Lens of the
Louisiana Experience with Jim Crow and Voting Rights in the 1890s, 33 Miss. C. L. REv. 201
(2014).
39. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
40. Grutter, 539 U.S. 306.
41. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1629. The Michigan Civil Rights Initiative, or Proposal 2, passed
by a fifty-eight percent to forty-two percent margin on November 7, 2006.
42. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1636-38 (Justice Kennedy joined by The Chief Justice and Justice
Alito, announced the judgment of the Court in a plurality opinion that rejected application of strict
scrutiny to the voter initiated ban on race-based preferences, viewing the question of whether to
allow race based preferences as properly decided by the electorate rather than the judiciary.). Id.
at 1638-39 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (briefly addressing the dissent as "expounding its own policy
preferences in favor of taking race into account" and stressing that racial preferences may do more
harm than good). Id. at 1639-1648 (Scalia, J. & Thomas, J., concurring) (on the grounds that the
Michigan voter initiative essentially provided what the text of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause "plainly requires" and solidly rejecting the view "that a facially neutral law may
deny equal protection solely because it has a disparate racial impact"). Id. at 1648-1651 (Breyer,
J., concurring) (on the grounds that the ban applied only to programs whose only justification was
to obtain a diverse student body, that while such programs are allowed under the Constitution they
are not required and that the ban reflected "decisionmaking through the democratic process" rather
than through an "unelected administrative body," a situation to be distinguished from that in the
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the state here was simply exercising its power to determine that educational
and other state actors would not be allowed to voluntarily use race-based
preferences, even to the extent they were constitutionally valid.
To an extent, this view is the result of examining race and racism
primarily or only through black/white relationships and slavery, and excluding
the accounts of other racialized groups that have been the object of systematic
and at times de jure exclusion, discrimination, and segregation: American
Indians, Mexican Americans and other Hispanics/Latina/os, the Chinese, the
Japanese, and other national origins that fit the label "Asian," and other ethnic
groups (for example, persons of Italian, Irish, and German origins were
racialized when they first entered the United States in significant numberS
43 )44
This view also ignores stark reminders in daily American life of the continuing
legacy of racism towards Native Americans, African Americans, and other
ethnic groups throughout the life of the country.
In particular, the Court developed a view of Equal Protection law that
values color-blindness or racial blindness to achieve equality. From this
perspective, a statute that purports to treat all races the same (i.e., bans use
of race) is the equivalent of a statute that does not, on its face, draw a racial
classification (uses a factor other than race even though the factor has a
disproportionate impact on different racial groups). Neither type of statute
is subject to strict scrutiny. This author joins the many who have argued that
a rigid constitutional norm requiring formal racial neutrality or blindness in
fact perpetuates structural racial inequalities.45 From this perspective,
Hunter-Seattle political process cases). Id. at 1651-1683 (Sotomayor, J. & Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(reasoning that the voter initiated ban constituted a distortion of governmental processes in a way
that burdened a racial minority and thus should be subject to strict scrutiny).
43. See e.g., IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAw THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE
(1996).
44. Richard Delgado, Centennial Reflections on the California Law Review's Scholarship on
Race: The Structure of Civil Rights Thought, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 431, 443-62 (2012); Delgado,
supra note 10, at 1519-20; Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm ofRace: The "Normal
Science" of American Racial Thought, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1213 (1997).
45. See e.g., DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (3D ED. 1992);
PATRICIA J. WLLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); Richard Delgado,
Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989);
Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of
Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953 (1993); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our
Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991); Neil Gotanda, Failure of the Color-Blind
Vision: Race, Ethnicity and the California Civil Rights Initiative, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1135
(1996); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Pamela S. Karlan, Discriminatory Purpose
and Mens Rea: The Tortured Argument of Invidious Intent, 93 YALE L.J. 111 (1983); Kimberl6
58 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 45:1
SLENCING TALK ABOUT RACE
statutes that prohibit ethnic studies, with some exceptions, are not racially
neutral, but instead subvert and subordinate the racial identities of individual
members of nonmajority groups.
II. The Journey from Milliken v. Bradley (II) to Parents Involved
in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1: Ethnic
Studies as a Desegregation Remedy
In Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), the Supreme Court upheld use of
ethnic studies program as one of the possible remedies that district courts could
impose on public school districts found to have intentionally discriminated on
the basis of race in the operation of their schools.46 The case involved the
public school system of Detroit, a school district whose student population was
disproportionately black.47 Initially the district court had ordered multi-district
relief to overcome the effects of "white flight," but the Supreme Court rejected
that as a remedy, reasoning that only districts that had been found guilty of
discrimination could be included in a metropolitan, multi-district remedy.48
On remand, the desegregation plan formulated by the parties and approved by
the district court included a pupil reassignment plan, but also tried to develop
the strength of schools within the district to make them more attractive to
students by including "compensatory programs" that provided in-service
training for teachers and administrators, guidance and counseling programs,
and revised testing procedures.
Also among the "compensatory components" proposed by the school
board were educational components including remedial reading programs,
bilingual education, and multiethnic studies, all designed "to remedy effects
of past segregation, to assure a successful desegregative effort, and to
minimize the possibility of resegregation." 49 With regards to the educational
components, the district court ordered that the district institute "a remedial
reading and communication skills program," with the exact contours of the
program to be fashioned by the superintendent of the district.5 0 The state
opposed any remedy other than a pupil assignment plan.
Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331 (1988); and too many other scholars to cite here.
46. Milliken II, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
47. On September 27, 1974, 257,396 students were enrolled in Detroit public schools; 71.5%
were black; 26.4% were white and 2.1% were other ethnic groups. Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 272.
48. Milliken , 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
49. Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 274.
50. Id. at 275.
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In upholding the district court's order, the Supreme Court applied
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,51 which had
recognized that to remedy racial discrimination in schools, schools had to be
able to consider and use race in fashioning remedies. 52 Ignoring race would
simply perpetuate the status quo: segregated schools. The Milliken II Court
found that the remedies ordered by the lower court were tailored to cure the
unconstitutional condition, which was Detroit's de jure segregated school
system. 53 The Court's opinion in Milliken II rested primarily on a defense of
remedial programs, not multiethnic programs. 4 Remedial programs are
designed to assist children who have demonstrated deficiencies in reading,
writing and mathematics. But much of the reasoning affirming the use of
remedial programs provided support for the use of multiethnic or ethnic
programs. Thus, the Court quoted, with approval, from a decision stating
that "specific educational programs designed to compensate minority group
children for unequal educational opportunities resulting from past or present
racial and ethnic isolation" were appropriate remedies.
In the post-Milliken II years, district courts presided over a substantial
number of desegregation cases. The goal of desegregation litigation, as the
Court previously stated, was to have public school districts achieve unitary
status. 56 In 1968, in Green v. County School Board, the Court held that
Virginia's "freedom of choice" plan was not an adequate remedy for
operating a dual system of education-one for whites and one for blacks.
The "ultimate end to be brought about" as a result of Brown was "a unitary,
nonracial system" of public education," consistent with "good faith
compliance" by school officials "at the earliest practicable date."57  The
program left it to parents to choose which school to attend; school authorities
did not use race in assigning students to school. In this sense, the plan was
the perfect race neutral "remedy." After three years in operation, the plan
had failed at dismantling the racially segregated public school system and
instead had shifted the burden of desegregation from school authorities to
parents. Virginia had to "come forward with a plan that promise[d]
51. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. Of Edu., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
52. Id. at 25.
53. Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 282.
54. Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 285-87.
55. Id. at 285-86. Justice Powell in his concurring opinion references the multi-ethnic studies
program as one of the approved remedies.
56. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
57. Green, 391 U.S. at 436-37.
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realistically to work . . . now."58 Green implicitly recognized that school
authorities had to take race into account in student admissions, in order to
undo the decades of racism and segregation. Green identified several factors
for schools districts and courts to examine: composition of student bodies,
faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities.59
In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, the Court
addressed the scope and form of equitable remedies available to school
districts found to have intentionally discriminated on the basis of race.60
The plan at issue in Swann included student assignment plans and school
attendance zones to achieve greater racial balance; racially mixed
faculties and administrative staffs; and busing to facilitate the changes in
attendance zones. Equitable powers, the Court noted, are about
"flexibility, rather than rigidity." 61 The remedial power of the court,
however, was limited by the nature of the constitutional violation. Not
so restrained, the school district decided:
School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to
formulate and implement educational policy, and might well conclude,
for example, that in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic
society, each school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white
students reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole. To do
this as an educational policy is within the broad discretionary powers
of school authorities; absent a finding of a constitutional violation,
however, that would not be within the authority of a federal court. As
with any equity case, the nature of the violation determines the scope
of the remedy. In default by the school authorities of their obligation
to proffer acceptable remedies, a district court has broad power to
fashion a remedy that will assure a unitary school system.62
School authorities had to eliminate invidious racial distinctions
operating throughout the school system. Courts were free to use their
equitable powers, moreover, to achieve desegregation of school faculties and
student populations, and to use racial ratios (not quotas) to achieve unitary
status in cases where a constitutional violation had been established. Courts
and school districts, thus, could consider race in student and faculty
58. Green, 391 U.S. at 439.
59. Id. at 435.
60. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Edu., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
61. Id. at 15.
62. Swann, 402 U.S. at 16.
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assignment to dismantle a racially discriminatory system, and establish and
maintain a unitary system. School districts could, as a matter of policy,
regardless of whether there had been a constitutional violation, decide that
"in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society, each school
should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting the
proportion for the district as a whole." 63
Milliken I, however, reigned in any effort by states to devise multi-
district remedies to thwart the impact of "white flight" (the abandonment of
public schools or innercity school districts by white families) and highly
segregated neighborhoods and districts. Milliken II instructed districts to
focus on improvement of schools and the school district itself, rather than on
attempts to have racially balanced schools, a goal impossible to attain in a
school district with a ninty percent single-race student body population.
Notwithstanding the limits on the permissible remedies allowed under
Milliken I, and the difficulties of establishing that segregated school districts
were segregated as a result of intentional conduct by state or local authorities
(in states where segregation was not mandated by law), by the 1980s, the
efforts to desegregate public schools had resulted in significant gains in
racial integration.t Ethnic studies programs fit the Milliken II remedy mold:
they were race conscious in that they were designed to assist students from
ethnic minorities to succeed academically, but they could be offered to all
students, with benefits to both white students and students of color.
Increasingly, however, the Court expressed concern over the length of
time federal district courts were exercising control over public school
districts traditionally controlled by local public authorities and states. 65 In
the 1990s, the Court signaled to school districts and federal courts overseeing
desegregation cases that desegregation injunctions were not intended to
operate in perpetuity. In Board of Education v. Dowell, the Court, in a 5-3
decision (one Justice did not participate), instructed federal district courts
63. Swann, 402 U.S. at 16.
64. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 805 (2007)
(Breyer, J., dissenting). Between 1968 and 1980, the number of black children attending a school
where minority children constituted more than half of the school fell from77% to 63% in the nation
(from 81% to 57% in the South) but then reversed direction by the year 2000, rising from 63% to
72% in the nation (from 57% to 69% in the South). Similarly, between 1968 and 1980, the number
of black children attending schools that were more than 90% minority fell from 64% to 33% in the
nation (from 78% to 23% in the South), but that too reversed direction, rising by the year 2000 from
33% to 35% in the nation (from 23% to 31% in the South).
65. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992); Bd. of
Edu. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991); Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990); Pasadena City Bd.
of Edu. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
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that school districts could be declared to have achieved unitary status when
they had complied in good faith with the desegregation decree and when the
vestiges of past discrimination had been eliminated to the extent
practicable.66 In Freeman v. Pitts, the Court went further and held that
school districts could achieve unitary status incrementally.67 And the
Court's ruling in Missouri v. Jenkins appeared to abandon the primary
objective of Brown v. Board of Education when it admonished courts to
"bear in mind that its end purpose is not only 'to remedy the violation' to the
extent practicable, but also 'to restore state and local authorities to the control
of a school system that is operating in compliance with the Constitution."68
In Missouri v. Jenkins, a 5-4 majority rejected remedies designed to reverse
the effect of "white flight," and make innercity public schools more attractive
to white and more affluent families through the use of some of the remedies
approved in Milliken IL That districts were operating single race schools
that looked and operated in ways similar to pre-Brown days became
constitutionally valid.
In the next decades, courts found numerous school districts achieved
unitary status, and released them from court supervision. 69 Some school
districts sought to maintain the gains achieved by desegregation remedies,
by maintaining some of the race conscious measures adopted to achieve
more integrated schools. In other contexts, like the awarding of government
contracts and employment, the Court had abandoned distinguishing between
invidious racial measures and benign racial measures; both were to be
subjected to strict scrutiny when used by government entities. 70  Thus,
affirmative action measures were to be treated as the equivalent of the kind
of invidious racism, premised on adherence to white supremacy, that
justified the racial segregation declared "inherently unequal" in Brown.
66. Dowell, 489 U.S. at 247-50.
67. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 485-92.
68. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 102 (citing Freeman, 503 U.S. at 489).
69. The Honorable George B. Daniels and Rachel Pereira, May It Please the Court Federal
Courts and School Desegregation Post-Parents Involved, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 626 (2015)
(reporting on twenty-four motions for unitary status in twenty-three school districts since Parents
Involved, with the majority of districts prevailing on unitary status and noting their impact, if any,
on graduation rates. The Tucson district, discussed in Judge Daniels' piece, had been denied unitary
status in part because of its lack of good faith commitment due to the persistent disparities in student
achievements). Id. at 662.
70. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003);
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469 (1989).
71. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
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Governmental entities seeking to use race conscious measures would have
to establish that the race conscious measures were necessary to accomplish
a compelling interest. The contracting cases made clear that remedying
specific, identifiable, racial discrimination in a specific area would constitute
a compelling interest, but that other goals of race conscious measures, such
as maintaining a racially or ethnically diverse workforce, in the absence of
invidious intent to discriminate, were not sufficient. Race conscious
measures of any kind came under sharp attack with some states adopting
outright prohibitions on any use of race in a variety of contexts including
admissions to educational institutions.72
To some extent, the modern Court continued to recognize the
constitutional validity of diversity and race conscious measures in the
context of higher education. Institutions of higher learning could seek to
recruit and maintain a diverse student body because they enjoyed substantial
discretion in making decisions about their educational mission and
admissions.73 In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court noted:
We have long recognized that, given the important purpose of public
education and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought
associated with the university environment, universities occupy a
special niche in our constitutional tradition . . . . In announcing the
principle of student body diversity as a compelling state interest,
Justice Powell invoked our cases recognizing a constitutional
dimension, grounded in the First Amendment, of educational
autonomy: "The freedom of a university to make its own judgments
as to education includes the selection of its student body." From this
premise, Justice Powell reasoned that by claiming "the right to select
those students who will contribute the most to the 'robust exchange of
ideas,"' a university "seek[s] to achieve a goal that is of paramount
importance in the fulfillment of its mission." 74
72. California adopted Proposition 209 in 1996, which banned consideration of race or
ethnicity in education, employment, and contracting. See Mario L. Barneset et al., Judging
Opportunity Lost: Assessing the Viability of Race-Based Affirmative Action After Fisher v.
University of Texas, 62 UCLA L. REv. 272 (2015).
73. Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). See Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411
(2013) [Fisher I]; Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
74. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329. See also Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411.
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As Rachel Moran has noted, only in higher education has the Court's
approach to racial equality "evolved from colorblindness to diversity."7 5
Primary and secondary public school systems do not traditionally exercise
much discretion in student admissions. Most public school systems are
required to admit all students who are in the system. 6 But the principle
embodied in the recognition that racial and ethnic diversity served a
compelling interest for the educational institutions in the Grutter and Gratz
cases, suggesting that the interest would be even more compelling for
primary and secondary public educational institutions since they teach
students during their most formative years, when their attitudes towards
issues of race and ethnicity might be more easily affected by being exposed
to a racially and ethnically diverse student body. The Grutter court
recognized that having a more diverse student body fostered 'cross-racial
understanding,' [which] helps to break down racial stereotypes, and enables
'[students] to better understand persons of different races.' 7 7 The Court had
noted the reports that showed that "the skills needed in today's increasingly
global workplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse
people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints."78
In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District
No. 1, 7 9 a plurality of Justices rejected the idea that public schools had a
compelling interest in student diversity that justified even minimally race
conscious measures.80 Justice Kennedy's concurring vote, necessary for a
majority on the issue, made clear that in his view achieving student diversity
might justify some race conscious measures and that "[d]iversity, depending
on its meaning and definition, is a compelling educational goal a school
district may pursue."81 Four dissenting justices would have recognized
75. Rachel Moran, Symposium: The School Desegregation Cases and the Uncertain Future
of Racial Equality: Rethinking Race, Equality, and Liberty: The Unfulfilled Promise of Parents
Involved, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1321, 1342 (2008). The other area where some race consciousness
appears to be constitutionally accepted is in the context of districting-as long as race is not the
predominant factor; legislatures or other entities engaged in the drawing of political districts may
consider race as one of many factors.
76. Charter schools, on the other hand, may exercise discretion in admissions. Public school
systems that rely on charter schools that are allowed to exercise discretion in admissions may be
more analogous to the institutions of higher education examined in Grutter v. Bollinger, Gratz v.
Bollinger, and Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin.
77. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
78. Id. at 330-31.
79. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
80. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 783 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
81. Id. at 788.
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student diversity as a sufficient interest to justify the use of race conscious
measures; thus, five justices recognized the constitutional validity of a school
district's need to achieve student diversity. However, the specific measures
pursued by the school districts before the Court, student transfer and
assignment policies that used race in addition to other factors, a different
majority of justices concluded, were not narrowly tailored and thus were
unconstitutional.
Justice Kennedy's concurrence left some uncertainty as to how public
school districts might be allowed to use race or ethnicity in achieving diversity.
Too much of the school district's decision-making was "broad and
imprecise."82 However, Justice Kennedy cautioned, the plurality's conclusion
that "the Constitution mandates that state and local school authorities must
accept the status quo of racial isolation in schools . . . is . . . profoundly
mistaken." 83 School districts could use some race conscious measures. Justice
Kennedy's criteria distinguished between race conscious measures that allow
or result in the different treatment of individuals, like the student assignment
plans at issue in the case, and race conscious measures that do not lead to
differences in individual treatment, like decisions about where to build schools
and line-drawing for enrollment zones.
In the administration of public schools ... it is permissible to consider
the racial makeup of schools and to adopt general policies to
encourage a diverse student body, one aspect of which is its racial
composition. If school authorities are concerned that the student-body
compositions of certain schools interfere with the objective of offering
an equal educational opportunity to all of their students, they are free
to devise race conscious measures to address the problem in a general
way and without treating each student in different fashion solely on
the basis of a systematic, individual typing by race.
School boards may pursue . . . [diversity] . . . through other means,
including strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance
zones with general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods;
allocating resources for special programs; recruiting students and
faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance,
and other statistics by race. These mechanisms are race conscious but
do not lead to different treatment based on a classification that tells
82. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 788 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
83. Id. at 788-89.
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each student he or she is to be defined by race, so it is unlikely any of
them would demand strict scrutiny to be found permissible. 84
Very few race conscious measures of the type that school districts were
using to maintain integrated or at least racially balanced schools would
survive Justice Kennedy's criteria. However, ethnic studies programs
seemed precisely to fit the kind of special policy or program identified in
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District8 5 as a race conscious measure that school
boards could pursue. 86
Ethnic studies do not lead to decisions about individual students based
on their racial or ethnic identity. They do not place burdens or disadvantage
students on the basis of a racial or ethnic classification.87 In fact, they may
be one of few constitutionally valid race conscious mechanisms left available
to school districts to proactively promote diversity. Simply acknowledging
and identifying a group's racial or ethnic identity does not reduce individual
identity to its racial or ethnic component. Instead, acknowledging and
celebrating differences is likely to promote better understanding and
communication between all students. That truth-telling about race may also
lead to discomfort, grief and, perhaps, accountability, does not justify
prohibiting the race talk. Instead, it is integral to addressing racism,
particularly in a society that has passively accepted as valid racially
segregated public (and private) schools.
III. Tucson's Ethnic Studies Program and Desegregation
Litigation
The Tucson Unified School District ("TUSD") litigation is typical of
desegregation litigation: lengthy, complicated, with frequent involvement by
courts.88 In 1974, African-American elementary and secondary school
students (the Fisher plaintiffs) sued the Tucson District for operating racially
segregated schools, 89 and Mexican-American elementary and secondary
84. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 789 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
85. Id. at 701.
86. Id. at 789 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part). Justice Kennedy does not refer expressly to
ethnic studies programs as an example of a valid race conscious measure.
87. Id.
88. Docket, No. 4:74-cv-00090-DCB, D. Ariz. (available on Pacer and on file with author)
(120-page docket as of 1/30/2017 with 1986 entries including filings of multiple parties, multiple
fee request adjudications, and budget considerations).
89. Fisher, et al. v. Lohr, et al., Civ. 74-90-TUC-WCF, (May 24, 1974 Dist. of Ariz.).
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school students (the Mendoza plaintiffs) sued the district in another action.90
Both cases were granted class action status and consolidated in 1975. The
district court approved a desegregation plan in 1978, which was affirmed by
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 1980.91
In challenging the school district, the Mendoza plaintiffs alleged that the
district had maintained a tri-ethnic segregated school system; discriminatory
tracking; inferior curricula and facilities for minorities; discrimination in the
hot lunch program; discrimination in special education program; failure to take
into account linguistic differences; and lack of bilingual notices. 92 Prior to the
settlement the claims involving inferior curricula and facilities, discrimination
in the lunch program, and lack of bilingual notices were dismissed. The claims
involving discriminatory tracking, discrimination in special education
programs, and failure to take into account linguistic differences were severed
and stayed because of an agreement between the District and the United States
to remedy these problems. 93
After discovery and trial, the district court found that the school district
had "failed to dismantle its former dual school system for Blacks and non-
Blacks, and had continued since 1954 to discriminate against Black
elementary and junior high school students." 94 The court, however, found that
the District had not operated a dual school system with respect to Mexican-
American students and that the District had not engaged in a system-wide
practice of intentional discrimination against Mexican Americans. 95 The court
found that nine schools in the District "suffered current effects of the past
intentionally segregative acts of the School District," and ordered the District
to prepare a desegregation plan. 96 The plan eventually adopted provided for
desegregation of the nine schools, immediate integration of three additional
schools, required the District to work with parents to determine future school
assignment policies, eliminated discrimination in faculty assignments,
training, and policies on testing and discipline, and provided for program
improvements, progress reports, and oversight. 97
90. Mendoza, et al. v. TUSD, et al., CIV 74-204 TUC WCF (October 11, 1974 Dist. of Ariz.).
91. Mendoza v. United States, 623 F. 2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1980).
92. Id. at 1341.
93. Id. at 1341-42.
94. Mendoza, 623 F.2d at 1341.
95. Id. at 1341-42.
96. Id.
97. Mendoza, 623 F.2d at 1342.
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In the 1990s, parents of students at the Tucson High Magnet School
sued challenging the adequacy of programs and facilities available to
minority students. 98 When the District requested closure of one of its most
successfully integrated high schools located in the center of the city and
construction of a new high school in the city's southwest, the court denied
permission to close the school, finding that closing the school would
substantially increase minority enrollment in some of the District's other
predominantly minority schools and eliminate the "District's only
ethnically-balanced high school." 99
The litigation intensified in 2005 when the District sought unitary status
and termination of federal oversight over its desegregation plan.10 0 The court
noted continuing gaps between achievement of the District's minority
students and white students and problems experienced by the plaintiff class
in securing the assistance of counsel. In order to achieve unitary status, the
TUSD had to establish that it had complied to the extent practicable with the
desegregation decree since entered, that it had eliminated the vestiges of past
illegal discrimination to the extent practicable, that its compliance was in
good faith and that it had a good faith commitment to maintaining the TUSD
as a nondiscriminatory system.10 1 The district court's review of the TUSD's
petition for unitary status focused primarily on student assignment and
student transfer policies as outlined in Parents Involved.102 Although the
TUSD schools consisted of schools that were for the most part de facto
segregated and majority-minority schools, the district court declared its goal
to be to "return the TUSD schools to the state because oversight and control
will be more effective placed in the hands of the public with the political
system at its disposal to address any future issues."1 03 Nonetheless, the court
determined it was not yet able to declare the TUSD in unitary status but
requested further filings by the parties on student assignment policies and
post-unitary policies and provisions. Ultimately, the district court found that
the TUSD had "failed to act in good faith in its ongoing operation of the
District under the Settlement Agreement" and "to monitor, track, review and
analyze the ongoing effectiveness of its programmatic changes to achieve
desegregation to the extent practicable or 'at least' not exacerbate the racial
98. Fisher v. Lohr, 821 F.Supp. 1342 (D. Ariz. 1993) (referring to Underwood v. Tucson
Unified School District).
99. Id. at 1345 (D. Ariz. 1993).
100. Fisher, 502 F.Supp. 2d at, 1034 (D. Ariz. 2006).
101. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249-50; Freeman, 503 U.S. at 491; Green, 391 U.S. at 435-38.
102. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
103. Fisher v. United States, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61679, at *43 (D. Ariz. Aug. 21, 2007).
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imbalances that exist in the District." 1 04 Notwithstanding its finding of the
TUSD's lack of good faith-which under the Green/Freeman/Dowell test
should have led the court to deny the petition-and its finding a number of
failures in the TUSD's implementation of the original decree, the court
granted the TUSD's petition for unitary status, on the condition that the
TUSD file a Post Unitary Plan for the court's adoption, on the reasoning that
the plan "can be monitored by the public, without the assistance of experts,
the judiciary or even counsel."105 The court's order was reversed on appeal
in 2011 and the case remanded to the district court to maintain jurisdiction
until TUSD demonstrated that it is in good faith compliance with the Post-
Unitary Plan over the course of a reasonable period of time. 106
Tucson's Mexican American Studies curriculum came about as a result
of the litigation. The 1980 Settlement Agreement included provisions for an
African American Studies Department ("AASD"), housed in the TUSD's
Multicultural Education Department, and provisions for instruction in Black
Studies. One of the programs adopted was Black Awareness Education, "to
help TUSD staff, students, and the community, gain knowledge and
understanding of the Black student's historical and cultural background from
a positive perspective."107  In 1976, the TUSD had established a Native
American Studies Department. In the 1990s, the AASD was
reconceptualized to serve the entire student body.10 8 In 1998, the TUSD
established a Mexican American/Raza Studies (or Hispanic Studies) and a
Pan Asian Studies department. 109 In 2004, the four ethnic departments in the
TUSD were brought back together under the Multicultural Education
Department "to increase cultural proficiency and to focus efforts on
increasing academic achievement for minority students and 'working to
eliminate the over-representation of minority students in drop out,
104. Fisher v. United States, 549 F.Supp. 2d 1132, 1134 (D. Ariz. 2008), rev'd and remanded
sub nom. Fisher v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 652 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2011).
105. Id. at 1167.
106. Fisher v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 652 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2011).
107. Fisher, 549 F. Supp. 2d at 1157.
108. Id. at 1158-59.
109. Id. at 1161, n.31. In the ethnic studies litigation, the Ninth Circuit, on appeal, found
the fact that the MAS program had first been developed in 1998, ten years before Tucson's Post
Unitary Status Plan, meant that it was not designed to remedy past discrimination, at least in the
context of the Post Unitary Status Plan. Arce v. Douglas, 793 F.3d at 973, 980-81 n.7. This
finding led the court to reject an argument that the state's ethnic studies ban substantially
interfered with the desegregation decree, or "the plaintiffs' ability to seek relief through the
PUSP." In essence, the Ninth Circuit appears to have been telling the Arce plaintiffs to seek
relief in the desegregation litigation.
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absenteeism, suspension, and expulsion rates."' 10 In the context of Hispanic
students, the TUSD's provisions at the time left them substantially
underserved, as the court recognized:
In 2004, AASD [African American Studies Department] had twenty-
one staff members, Native American Studies had sixteen staff
members, Mexican American/Raza Studies had eight staff, and Pan
Asian Studies had five staff members. AASD was serving 20 to 30%
of the Black student population, which by 2003-04 was approximately
6.7% of the total student body. (D's Memorandum at 33.) Even with
AASD serving approximately 5% of the Hispanic student population,
it is unimaginable that the eight-staff Mexican American/RAZA
Studies department would be capable of serving the 30,118 Hispanic
students. While the Settlement Agreement did not expressly require
such service, the annual reports reflect the District's own undertakings
broadened the scope of its obligations to reach all minority students
not just African American students."
The TUSD's student population had changed dramatically in the almost
four decades of litigation-Hispanics had become the largest ethnic student
group in the TUSD. By 2011, the TUSD enrolled 52,987 students, 60%
Hispanic, 24% White/Anglo, 5.6% African American, 3.9% Native
American, 2.6% Asian American, and 2.4% multiracial.1 12
Accordingly, the Post-Unitary Plan, developed by TUSD in its effort to
gain unitary status and adopted in 2009, expanded the Mexican-American
Studies (MAS) program.1 13 The program primarily consisted of course
offerings at the secondary level in American history/Chicano perspectives;
American government/social justice education project; English/Latino
literature, and Mexican-American studies courses at the middle and
elementary school level.
The program also provided for teacher continuing education; student,
parent, and community involvement focused on facilitating communication
between schools and parents, surveying student population to monitor and
adjust the course offerings and monitoring the percentage of students of low
110. Fisher, 549 F. Supp. 2d at 1161. (citation omitted).
111. Id. (citations omitted).
112. Cambium Report, supra note 1, at 5.
113. TUSD Unified School District Post-Unitary Status Plan, Exhibit B to Plaintiffs' Motion
for Summary Judgment, Acosta v. Huppenthal, No.2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37408 (D. Ariz. 2013),
No. CV 10-623 TUC AWT, filed 10/21/11, D. Ariz., at 31-33.
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socioeconomic status engaged in the courses to ensure recruitment,
achievement and retention of disadvantaged students; and ensuring equitable
representation of Hispanic students, through review, continued development
of resources, and other activities to attain equitable representation of
Hispanic students in Advanced Placement courses. The plan also provided
for continuation of the African American Studies Department.1 14
TUSD's MAS program offerings were open to all students. At the time
of the enactment of the ethnic studies ban, it was part of the Post-Unitary
Plan that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently ordered in 2011
be monitored by the district court to determine whether the school district
could be declared in unitary status because it had demonstrated good faith
compliance with the plan. The district court had appointed a Special Master
to develop a Unitary Status Plan in fall 2011, and the Special Master had
begun work with the parties on the plan. In the meantime, the district
remained subject to the existing Post Unitary Status Plan.1 15
IV. Arizona's Prohibition of Ethnic Studies: Context Matters"t6
In 2010, Arizona's legislature enacted its prohibition of ethnic studies,
HB 228 1,117 in the same legislative session that produced SB 1070, targeting
undocumented immigrants and immigration activities, parts of which were
struck down on preemption grounds by the Supreme Court in Arizona v.
United States."' The bill banning ethnic studies was spearheaded by the
state Superintendent of Public Instruction, Thomas C. Horne, who at the time
simultaneously was running for the Republican nomination for state attorney
general. Mr. Horne publicly declared his target to be the ethnic studies
curriculum at Tucson Unified School District. 119 In 2007, Mr. Horne had
114. TUSD Unified School District Post-Unitary Status Plan, Exhibit B to Plaintiffs' Motion
for Summary Judgment, Acosta v. Huppenthal, No.2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37408 (D. Ariz. 2013),
No. CV 10-623 TUC AWT, filed 10/21/11, D. Ariz., at 33.
115. The United States' Opposition to the State of Arizona's Motion for Intervention, No. 74-
90 TUC DCB (May 24, 2012), at 4.
116. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327 ("Context matters when reviewing race-based governmental
action under the Equal Protection Clause.").
117. H.B. 2281, 49th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Az. 2010).
118. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
119. Mary Jo Pitzi, Arizona Bill Targets Ban on Ethnic Studies, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (May 1,
2010) http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/local/articles/2010/05/01/20100501arizona-bill-
bans-ethnic-studies.html. The account of these events is based on the district and appellate court
opinions, the full court record, and on testimony introduced at the trial of the case held June 26
through July 21, 2017. The trial transcripts are available at https://law.seattleu.edu/centers-and-
institutes/korematsu-center/litigation/arizona-ethnic-studies-case.
72 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 45:1
SLENCING TALK ABOUT RACE
issued an open letter to the citizens of Tucson that the MAS program should
be terminated. 120 Horne was responding to an incident involving a student
walkout to a political speech by Margaret Garcia Dugan, the Deputy
Superintendent of Public Education for Arizona. 121 In 2006, Dolores Huerta,
an activist with the United Farm Workers, delivered a speech to Tucson High
students at a school assembly in which she stated that "Republicans hate
Latinos."122 After the talk, students were allowed to ask questions of Ms.
Huerta. In response to the Huerta remark, Mr. Horne accompanied his
Deputy Superintendent Margaret Dugan to Tucson High, so that Dugan
could speak to Tucson High students. 123  This time, students were not
allowed to ask questions. In response, some students taped their mouths
shut, turned their backs, raising their fists, and walked out on the speech. 124
This incident appears to have provoked Mr. Horne into his efforts, both
legislative and administrative, to terminate the Tucson MAS program. 125 In
this endeavor he was joined by fellow Republican state senator John
Huppenthal, one of the sponsors of SB 1070, and the person elected to follow
Mr. Horne as superintendent of education for Arizona. In 2014, Mr. Horne
lost his bid for re-election and was investigated for campaign improprieties.
HB 2281 originally prohibited only classes that "are designed primarily
for pupils of a particular ethnic group" or that "advocate ethnic solidarity
instead of the treatment of pupils as individuals."1 26  Subsequently,
legislators amended the bill to remove these two provisions and instead add
two provisions prohibiting classes promoting the overthrow of the U.S.
government and promoting resentment towards a race or class of people. 127
Subsequently, those provisions were reintroduced and enacted into law. 128
The statute set out as a policy goal the deterrence of racial resentment
or hatred. The statute's declaration of policy stated: "[t]he legislature finds
and declares that public school pupils should be taught to treat and value
120. Cambium Report, supra note 1, at 11.
121. Arce v. Douglas, 793 F.3d 968, 974 (9th Cir. 2015).
122. Gonzalez v. Douglas, No. CV 10-623 TUC AWT, Memorandum of Decision, D. Az.
August 22, 2017 at 4.
123. Id. at 5.
124. Id.
125. Arce, 793 F.3d at 974-75.
126. H.B. 2281, 49th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Az. 2010).
127. Defendants' Ex. 512 and Testimony of Mark Anderson, Tr. (July [sic June] 28, 2017) at
29. Testimony at trial made it clear that these two provisions would not make it easy to eliminate
the MAS program so the original provisions were restored.
128. ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 15-112 (A) (2011).
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each other as individuals and not be taught to resent or hate other races or
classes of people."1 29 The statutory goal was achieved by prohibiting classes
that: "(1) Promote the overthrow of the U.S. government[;] (2) Promote
resentment toward a race or class of people[;] (3) Are designed primarily for
pupils of a particular ethnic group[;] (4) Advocate ethnic solidarity instead
of the treatment of pupils as individuals."1 30
Exempted from the prohibition were:
(1) Courses or classes for Native American pupils that are required
to comply with federal law;
(2) The grouping[s] of pupils according to academic performance,
including capability in the English language, that may result in a
disparate impact by ethnicity;
(3) Courses or classes that include the history of any ethnic group
and that are open to all students, unless the course/class violates
subsection A; 13 1
(4) Courses or classes that include discussion of controversial
aspects of history. 132
A special provision addressed study of the Holocaust and genocide:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to restrict or prohibit the
instruction of the Holocaust, any other instance of genocide, or the
historical oppression of a particular group of people based on
ethnicity, race, or class. 133
The State Board of Education or Superintendent of Public Instruction
determines whether a school district violates the statute. The school district
has sixty days to comply. If the school district does not comply the state
withholds up to ten percent of monthly apportionment of state aid.
The statute, then, expressly regulated race and ethnicity, which under
established constitutional norms, generally would require application of
strict scrutiny. 134 The statute, on its face, exempted certain racial or ethnic
129. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15-111 (2011).
130. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15-112 (A) (2011).
131. Subsection A contains the prohibited courses including those that teach resentment or
hatred and that are designed for "a particular ethnic group."
132. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15-112(E) (2011).
133. Id.
134. Parents Involved in Cmty Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007); Johnson
v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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groups, like certain classes for Native Americans and classes about the
Holocaust, thus, on its face the statute treated certain racial or ethnic groups
differently than others. The stated policy goal was to deter racial hatred or
resentment by teaching students to treat each other as individuals, rather than
teaching students "to hate other races or classes of people." But the statute,
read as a whole, made it clear that the kind of classes prohibited by the statute
could result in the prohibition of traditional courses, including courses that
discussed controversial aspects of history; thus, the provision for the
exemptions. Rather than provide for a curriculum to teach students about
group stereotyping, the statute prohibited as a general matter courses
designed primarily for pupils of a particular ethnic group, something that
Parents Involved suggested was one of the race conscious measures
available to public schools to support school diversity. The statute also
prohibited classes that advocate ethnic solidarity instead of the treatment of
the pupils as individuals. The statute, however, did not explain why or how
prohibiting the advocacy of ethnic solidarity, as opposed to any other kind
of group solidarity, something that was long a part of the American political
tradition, was harmful or would impair the treatment of pupils as individuals.
In this sense, its use of language is reminiscent of "newspeak" in Orwell's
1984-group solidarity is treated as being synonymous with elimination of
the individual, and ethnic identity is treated as a way to silence the individual
rather than as a fundamental part of individual identity.
Teaching students to treat each other as individuals doesn't foreclose
exploration or acknowledgment of group racial or ethnic identity-other
provisions in the statute explicitly acknowledged this. For example, the
provision exempting instruction of "the historical oppression of a particular
group of people based on ethnicity, race, or class,"1 35 is precisely what the
MAS program at Tucson appears to have been exploring. In fact, treating
individuals as individuals, without acknowledging that their individual
identity reflects their membership in a particular racial or ethnic group is
significant because society has historically and traditionally rendered that
aspect of their identity as the defining and material trait, perpetuates
inferiority and subordination of that racial or ethnic group. Thus, the stated
policy goal reflected a lack of awareness and sensitivity to the ways in which
racial and ethnic identity is part of individual identity.
Moreover, the statute viewed treating individuals as individuals as
being what is necessary to eliminate racism. Yet, it is possible to treat
individuals as individuals in a racist manner, and it is possible to act in ways
135. ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 15-112 (F) (2011).
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that are injurious to individuals who possess a racially or ethnically identifiable
trait without engaging in racial hatred or resentment. Much of the reasoning
used in the Confederate South rejected the idea of "racial hatred or resentment"
and instead considered individual members of a particular race inferior to the
dominant race, which in their view justifiably denied them autonomy over
their lives. This same kind of thinking, rather than hatred or resentment, was
used to justify denying women autonomy and integrity in their lives. The logic
reflected in the statute's purpose was flawed.
Moreover, the statute reflected internal inconsistencies that rendered it
irrational. For example, the prohibitions against classes that "promote
resentment toward a race or class of people" and "advocate ethnic solidarity"
were directly in contradiction with the exception provided for classes
studying the "Holocaust . . . genocide . . . or the historical oppression of a
particular group of people based on ethnicity, race, or class."1 36 The most
glaring exemption missing from the Arizona statute was an exemption for
slavery, segregation and Jim Crow, and African-American studies,
something that had been part of the original desegregation agreement in the
Tucson desegregation litigation. That the Arizona legislature opted to
specifically include the Holocaust-initiated and implemented by Nazi
Germany primarily in Europe-but omitted any reference to slavery and
segregation in the United States, plainly evinces a willingness to ignore or
acknowledge U.S.-based racial or ethnic oppression. The statute also
expressed a preference for classes about certain ethnic or racial groups, but
silenced others. 137  Even some of the preferred groups, like Native
Americans, are preferred in a way that denies them autonomy and self-
identification, outside of the narrow confines of tribal reservations: Classes
for Native Americans are allowed if they "are required to comply with
federal law."1 38
The statutory language also created external inconsistencies. The
state's overall educational goals were to educate students to develop and
exercise critical thinking skills and achieve comprehensive subject matter
mastery. 139 Given the uncontroverted evidence that all students tended to
improve performance when participating in classes "designed primarily for
pupils of a particular ethnic group," the statutory language strongly
136. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15-112 (2011).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See e.g., ARIZONA GOVERNOR, OFFICE OF EDUCATION, https://education.azgovemor.
gov/edulstrategic-goals (last visited Sep. 28, 2017).
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suggested that the stated justifications were pretextual in nature, and that the
state legislature intended to silence narratives that reflected a different racial
or ethnic perspective.
Assuming for the moment that students could be taught to see the world
as made up of individuals whose merits must be assessed acontextually-
without reference to traits that have historically been assigned value like
race, color, national origin, or ethnicity-the methodology adopted by
Arizona to accomplish this goal was not only unlikely to accomplish the
goal, but was actually designed to frustrate it. Celebrating the
accomplishments or uniqueness of a particular ethnic heritage does not
automatically generate hatred; ethnic studies and race consciousness in the
curriculum enhances and promotes unity by valuing various aspects of
identity, including one's racial or ethnic identity. 140
Facially, the statute and the legislative record make clear that it was not
neutral with regards to race or ethnicity: It used race and ethnicity as the
defining characteristics to bring a course or academic program within its
reach. Yet, it provided exemptions for certain racial or ethnic groups.
Plainly, the statute raised First Amendment concerns because it banned
certain types of speech, curriculum, and education, but its targeting of ethnic
solidarity and ethnic group identity raised serious Equal Protection concerns
as well, so as to justify the application of strict scrutiny. Particularly because
First Amendment law has evolved in ways that substantially reduce the level
of protection available to students and teachers and increases the level of
deference courts give to administrative or state choices over curriculum,
Equal Protection doctrine should continue to protect students of different
races and ethnicities from being targeted or discriminated against through
curricular choices that result from political processes born out of animus
rather than legitimate educational decision-making.
V. The Arizona Statute as Applied
Arizona's actions made clear its intended target. Still serving as State
Superintendent, Horne applied the statute promptly to sanction only the
MAS program at Tucson Unified School District No. 1. Mr. Horne issued
findings on December 30, 2010 (one day before the statute went into effect
and his last day in office as superintendent) that the TUSD was in violation
140. See Delgado, supra note 10, at 1543-46 (discussing political scientist Charles Taylor's
theory of recognition and the "right to have others recognize you as you are or, at any rate as you
wish to be taken and seen").
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of A.R.S. § 15-112,141 notwithstanding that it was at the time part of the Post
Unitary Status Plan, which had been approved by the court in the
desegregation litigation.
In his findings, Mr. Horne stated that he drafted HB 2281 with the
TUSD MAS program in mind because, in his view, the MAS program was
in violation of all of the provisions in § 15-112(A), and thus that only
elimination of the program would cure the violation. 142 The findings gave
the TUSD sixty days to eliminate the courses and notified it that failure to
do so would subject it to having ten percent of its budget withheld, as
provided for in the statute. 143 Shortly thereafter, Mr. Horne was elected
Attorney General of the state. As attorney general, he represented the state
in the litigation until 2014, when he lost reelection.
Mr. Horne's successor, John Huppenthal, proved similarly antagonistic
toward the TUSD MAS program. While serving in the Arizona legislature,
Mr. Huppenthal had worked actively to enact HB 2281. He had restored
provisions that had been removed from the bill while before the legislature,
in particular the provisions granting the superintendent authorization to
enforce the bill and the provisions prohibiting classes designed for pupils of
a particular ethnic group and that advocated ethnic solidarity. 144 Further, Mr.
Huppenthal had campaigned for the office of state superintendent on
stopping the MAS program, what he referred to as "la Raza" claiming that
the program taught students "hate" or "racist" speech. 145 Mr. Huppenthal
also moved the effective date of the bill to after the election for state
superintendent. 146 Perhaps aware that the actions of Mr. Horne were open to
challenge, he retained an out-of-state educational consultant to conduct an
audit of the Mexican American Studies Department of the TUSD. 147 The
audit aimed to determine whether the MAS program was designed to
improve student achievement; whether the program had actually improved
141. Finding by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction of Violation by Tucson Unified
School District Pursuant to AR.S. § 15-112(B), Dec. 30, 2010, available as Exhibit B to Plaintiffs'
Third Amended Complaint, Acosta v. Huppenthal (No. CV 10-623 TUC AWT) [hereinafter
Findings]. See Arce v. Douglas, 793 F.3d at 968, 975 (9th Cir. 2015).
142. Findings, supra note 141;Arce, 793 F. 3d at 975.
143. Findings, supra note 141.
144. Testimony of Mark Anderson, Trial Transcript at 38, Gonzalez v. Douglas (No. 4:10cv
00623 AWT). Mr. Anderson, a former Arizona state legislator, worked for Mr. Horne from 2009
to 2010 as a lobbyist, including HB 2281, the bill that became 15-112.
145. Testimony of Mark Anderson, supra note 144, at 72-73.
146. Id. at 136.
147. Gonzalez v. Douglas, No. CV 10-623 TUC AWT, Memorandum of Decision, D. Az.
Aug. 22, 2017 at 16.
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student achievement; and whether the program was in compliance with
A.R.S. §15-112. 148
According to the Cambium Report, most students participating in the
MAS program were Hispanic. The report noted that 1,343 middle and high
school students participating in MAS classes, of which 90.32% were
Hispanic, 5.20% White/Anglo, 1.49% African American, 2.09% Native
American, .45% Asian American, and .45% multiracial. The report found
evidence of "questionable commentary and inappropriate student text"
apparently consisting of references to SB 1070, the State Superintendent, and
HB 2281, but did not find those materials currently in use. 149 The report also
found some books on the MAS Reading Lists to be questionable, either
because of "questionable" content or because designed for an adult reader. 150
Books determined to be of questionable content by the audit included
Richard Delgado's and Jean Stefancic's Critical Race Theory: An
Introduction, H. Zinn's A People's History of the United States, J. Loewen's
Lies My Teacher Told Me: Everything Your American History Teacher Got
Wrong, Jonathan Kozol's Savage Inequalities, Sandra Cisneros' Woman
Hollering Creek, William Shakespeare's The Tempest, James Baldwin's The
Fire Next Time, and Laura Esquivel's Like Water for Chocolate.151
Notwithstanding, the audit report ultimately concluded that "based upon
observations, the auditors saw no evidence of previous questionable MASD
materials, nor any damaging language that could incite resentment in
children."1 52 The report found that the program had been successful at
improving student achievement. 153 The report noted:
It is apparent that students enrolled in MASD courses in high school
graduate ... at a rate of 5% more than their counterparts in 2005, and
at the most, a rate of 11% more in 2010. Students who complete a
MASD course during their senior year of high school are more likely
to graduate than compared to non-MASD counterparts. 154
148. Cambium Report, supra note 1, at 4.
149. Gonzalez v. Douglas, No. CV 10-623 TUC AWT, Memorandum of Decision, D. Az.
Aug. 22, 2017 at 18-20.
150. Id.
151. Delgado, supra note 10, at n.48 (with a longer list of banned books).
152. Cambium Report, supra note 1, at 38; see Gonzalez v. Douglas, No. CV 10-623 TUC
AWT, Memorandum of Decision, D. Az.. Aug. 22, 2017, at 18-20.
153. Cambium Report, supra note 1, at 43-47.
154. Cambium Report, supra note 1, at 47.
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The audit concluded, "no observable evidence was present to indicate
that any classroom within TUSD is in direct violation of the law." 55
Moreover, the report stated, "MASD courses promote a culture of excellence
and support and an environment conducive to learning."1 56
Notwithstanding the conclusions of the audit, Mr. Huppenthal rejected
its findings and directed his staff to conduct their own investigation. 157
Subsequently, Huppenthal declared the program in violation of subsections
(A)(2), (A)(3), and (A)(4) of the statute in June 2011.158 Mr. Huppenthal
found that the Arizona Department of Education had been given incomplete
curriculum materials by MAS; that the program promoted resentment
towards a race or class of people due to references to white people as being
".oppressors"; and, particularly troubling to Mr. Huppenthal, that ninty
percent of MAS participants were Hispanic, a disproportionate
representation given the population demographics of the student population
as a whole. 159  Mr. Huppenthal's findings ordered TUSD to bring the
program into compliance with the statute, but did not require elimination of
the program. 160 TUSD was again given sixty days prior to withholding of
ten percent of its budget. 161
The school board administratively appealed in June 2011.162 The
administrative law judge affirmed the state superintendent in December
2011. On January 16, 2012, Huppenthal withheld ten percent of TUSD's
funds as of the date of his initial finding of a violation and required TUSD
to remove all MAS instructional materials by February 29, 2012.163 The
TUSD Governing Board suspended the MAS program on January 10, 2012,
notwithstanding its inclusion in the Fisher Post Unitary Status Plan, and the
fact that the district had been denied unitary status for its failure to
155. Cambium Report, supra note 1, at 50.
156. Cambium Report, supra note 1, at 50.
157. Arce v. Douglas, 793 F.3d at 968, 975 (9th Cir. 2015).
158. Superintendent of Public Instruction John Huppenthal Statement of Finding Regarding
Tucson Unified School District's Violation of AR.S. §15-112, available as Exhibit D to Plaintiffs'
Third Amended Complaint, Acosta v. Huppenthal (2013) [hereinafter Huppenthal Statement of
Finding] (No. CV 10-623 TUC AWT) (Huppenthal found the program to "promote resentment
toward a race or class of people," to be "designed primarily for pupils of a particular ethnic group,"
and to "advocate ethnic solidarity instead of the treatment of pupils as individuals.").
159. Id.
160. Huppenthal Statement of Finding, supra note 158.
161. Gonzalez v. Douglas, No. CV 10-623 TUC AWT, Memorandum of Decision, D. Az.
Aug. 22, 2017 at 23.
162. Id. at 22-23.
163. Arce v. Douglas, 793 F.3d at 968, 975 (9th Cir. 2015).
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demonstrate good faith compliance with the desegregation decree.1 64 The
TUSD notified the Fisher court that the MAS program had been suspended,
and in February 2012, the Mendoza plaintiffs responded and requested
reinstatement of MAS. 165 The court denied the motion to reinstate MAS
but stated that the status of the MAS program would be addressed in the
Unitary Status Plan ("USP"). 166 The Special Master had indicated in a
memorandum issued in February that the curricular program envisioned in
the USP would include culturally relevant courses. 167  The Mendoza
plaintiffs moved the court to reconsider reinstatement of MAS courses in
March and the court again denied the motion. 168 The Special Master's
March 28 2012 Memorandum declared the intention to develop a culturally
relevant curriculum. 169
Teachers in the MAS program, students, and the Director of the MAS
program, Sean Arce, filed suit in federal court shortly after enactment of HB
2281, on October 18, 2010, and the complaint subsequently was amended to
include an as-applied challenge on the basis of the Superintendent's
enforcement action.17 0
In May 2012, while defending the ban on ethnic studies, Attorney
General Horne moved to intervene in the desegregation case, "to ensure that
the Special Master's proposed curricular revisions for in-depth ethnic studies
courses in the Unitary Status Plan do not violate state law."171 The district
court denied intervention by the State of Arizona but granted it leave to
appear as amicus curiae. 172 Over the course of the next few years, the parties
164. Fisher v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 652 F.3d 1131, 1141-43 (9th Cir. 2011).
165. Motion for Special Master to Take Action and Response to Notice to Court Concerning
Suspension of Mexican American Studies Courses by Plaintiffs Edward A. Contreras, Maria
Mendoza, The United States' Opposition to the State of Arizona's Motion for Intervention, No. 74-
90 TUC DCB (May 24, 2012), at 7.
166. Order of February 29, 2012, Case No. 4:74-cv-00204-DCB, D. Ariz.
167. Memorandum by Special Master of February 23, 2012, No. 4:74-cv-00090 TUC DCB
(Feb. 29, 2012).
168. Motion for Reconsideration re 1360 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief by Maria
Mendoza, No. 4:74-cv-00090 TUC DCB (Mar. 14, 2012); Order denying 1364 Motion for
Reconsideration, No. 4:74-cv-00090 TUC DCB (Apr. 3, 2012).
169. Memorandum of March 28, 2012 by Special Master Willis Hawley, No. 4:74-cv-00090
TUC DCB (Apr. 5, 2012).
170. Complaint, Acosta et al. v. Horne et al., No. 10CV00623, 2010 WL 11413395 (D. Ariz.
Oct. 18, 2010).
171. State of Arizona's Motion to Intervene, No. 4:74-cv-00204-DCB (D. Ariz. May 10,
2012).
172. Order denying Motion to Intervene, Case No. 4:74-cv-00204-DCB (D. Ariz. June 14,
2012).
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in the desegregation case worked on a Unitary Status Plan with the Special
Master. The parties litigated almost everything in the plan, including the
question of a culturally relevant curriculum. 173 That litigation continues.
In March 2013, the district court dismissed the plaintiff teachers and
director of MAS in the Arce case for lack of standing and decided the
remaining claims on summary judgment, despite the fact that neither party
had moved for summary judgment. 174 The court upheld the statute under the
First Amendment, Equal Protection, and Substantive Due Process grounds
but struck down its prohibition of classes or programs that "are designed
primarily for pupils of a particular ethnic group" as facially overbroad.1 7 5
The court prefaced its opinion by acknowledging, "the considerable
deference that federal courts owe to the State's authority to regulate public
education."1 76 Echoing recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions, the court
noted, "they are issues that must be left to the State of Arizona and its citizens
to address through the democratic process." 177
In deciding the First Amendment claims, the court recognized only two
possible First Amendment student rights: a right to speak freely on school
grounds and a right to receive a broad range of information so that they could
freely form their own thoughts.1 7 8 The court concluded, however, that the
statute and the District's enforcement of the statute implicated neither of the
rights. 179 To the extent the students' rights to receive information was
impacted, the court reasoned that the statute passed the appropriate standard
of scrutiny because it was reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogical
interest.180 Only the provision prohibiting courses designed primarily for
pupils of a particular ethnic group, § 15-112(A)(3), the court found to be
substantially overbroad, because whatever legitimate interests could be
attained through the provision were covered under the first two provisions. 181
To the extent it sought to advance additional interests, the provision could
173. See Docket, Fisher, et al. v. Tucson Unified, et al., No. 4:74-cv-00090-DCB.
174. Acosta v. Huppenthal, 2013 WL 871892 (D. Ariz. Mar. 8, 2013).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Acosta v. Huppenthal, 2013 WL 871892 at 4-7.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 7.
181. Id. at 10.
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not be sustained because it threatened "to chill the teaching of legitimate and
objective ethnic courses. 18 2
In deciding the Equal Protection claim, the court concluded that the
Arizona statute did not create a classification on the basis of race or national
origin on its face, so as to justify application of strict scrutiny. 183 In addition,
the court concluded, although the legislative history contained red flags that
might "spark suspicion" that animus towards an ethnic group motivated the
legislature, they were insufficient to establish discriminatory intent. 184 The
court discussed the factors relevant to discerning discriminatory intent, but
applied them to the record before the court, before discovery and before trial,
on summary judgment.18 5 Moreover, the court found that the statute did not
represent the kind of political process obstruction that would render it invalid
under the Hunter/Seattle line of cases. 186 Thus, the court concluded that the
statute merited only a rational basis scrutiny, and survived challenge under
the Equal Protection clause. 187
The state appealed the district court's determination that the provision
in the Arizona statute prohibiting courses that "are designed primarily for
pupils of a particular ethnic group" was facially overbroad. 88 The plaintiffs
appealed the court's ruling that the statutory provisions were severable and
that the remaining provisions did not violate the First Amendment. 189 In
addition, the plaintiffs appealed the court's grant of summary judgment to
the state on the equal protection claims. A number of amici filed briefs in
support of the plaintiffs in the case, including the authors whose books had
been physically removed from the MAS classrooms in the TUSD. 190
182. Acosta v. Huppenthal, 2013 WL 871892 at 10.
183. Id. at 13.
184. Id. at 14.
185. Id. (discussing the factors identified by the U.S. Supreme Court as relevant to determining
intent in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-68
(1977)).
186. Acosta v. Huppenthal, 2013 WL 871892 at 13 (referring to Washington v. Seattle School
District No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969)).
187. Acosta v. Huppenthal, 2013 WL 871892 at 15.
188. Appellees' Principal and Response Brief, Maya Arce v. John Huppenthal, Nos. 13-15656,
13-15760.
189. Brief of Appellants, Arce v. Huppenthal, No. 13-15657, 13-15760, November 18, 2013;
Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees' Response and Reply Brief, Arce v. Huppenthal, Nos. 13-
15657, 13-15760, June 2, 2014.
190. Brief for Amici Curiae 48 Public School Teachers in Support of Appellants' Request for
Reversal, Maya Arce v. John Huppenthal, No. 13-15657, 13-15760; Brief of Amicus Curiae Latina
and Latino Critical Legal Theory, Inc., Arce v. Huppenthal, No. 13-15657, 13-15760; Brief of
Authors Rodolfo Acuna, Bill Bigelow, Richard Delgado, and Jean Stefancic as Amici Curiae, Arce
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VI. On Appeal in the Ninth Circuit
In 2015, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's holding that one
of the provisions in the statute-the provision that prohibited courses and
classes designed for pupils of a particular ethnic group-was
unconstitutionally broad but severable from the rest of the statute, and that
the other provisions were neither overbroad under the First Amendment or
vague in violation of the Due Process Clause. 191 The court reversed the
district court's summary judgment as to the Equal Protection disparate
treatment claim and remanded that claim for trial, precluding disposition of
the claim through summary judgment. 192 The court also remanded the First
Amendment viewpoint discrimination claim for further proceedings.1 93
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the lower court that the statute did not
facially discriminate on the basis of race or ethnicity so as to justify strict
scrutiny.194 Specifically, with regards to the provisions prohibiting classes
designed primarily for pupils of a particular ethnic group and advocating
ethnic solidarity, the court reasoned that the term "ethnic" in the statute did
not refer to ethnic minorities, but to all ethnic backgrounds, including
majority ethnic backgrounds.1 95 The court rejected consideration of the
legislative history in determining the meaning of the term, reasoning that
only if the term were ambiguous would consulting the legislative history
be appropriate.1 96
Although the MAS plan was included as part of the Fisher/Mendoza
Post Unitary Status Plan approved by the district order in the desegregation
v. Huppenthal, Nos. 13-15657, 13-15760; Brief of Chief Earl Warren Institute on Law and Social
Policy, Arce v. Huppenthal, Nos. 13-15657, 13-15760; Brief of Freedom to read Foundation,
American Library Association, et.al., Arce v. Huppenthal, No. 13-15657; Brief of the National
Education Association and Arizona Education Association as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-
Appellants, No. 13-15657, 13-15760. See also Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation
in Support of Neither Party and In Support of Neither Affirmance nor Reversal, Arce v. Huppenthal,
No. 13-15657. The oral argument before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is available
here http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/medialview-video.php?pk vid=0000006927.
191. Arce v. Douglas, 793 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 2015).
192. Arce, 793 F.3d at 976-77. The case went to trial in July 2017. See Roque Planas,
Mexican-American Studies Ban Unlikely to See Trial This Year, HUFF. POST, (Sept. 29, 2016).
Pending before the court is another motion for partial summary judgment filed by the defendants
on September 26, 2016, on the First Amendment viewpoint discrimination claim. Gonzalez v.
Douglas, Case No. 4:10-cv-00623-AWT, Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
Plaintiffs' First Amendment Claim.
193. Arce, 793 F. 3d at 977.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 977.
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litigation, and had come about relatively early in the litigation, the court
rejected the argument that Arizona's statute constituted interference with
a desegregation remedy and, thus, obstructed the political process in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause as interpreted in Hunter v.
Erickson1 97 and Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1. 198 The court
found the fact that the program had been implemented early in the
desegregation case, rather than when the post unitary status plan was
ordered, meant that it could not be considered a remedy-a somewhat
baffling conclusion. The court dealt with this argument in a footnote,
however, perhaps conveying its view as to the viability of this type of
argument, which seems at odds with the goals of desegregation cases: a
good faith effort to eliminate the vestiges of desegregation to the extent
practicable and good faith compliance with court orders, 199 but perhaps
reflects the paucity of court opinions that have rested on the "political
structure" Equal Protection cases, as well as the Court's Schuette
decision. 200 The court also noted that plaintiffs could continue to seek
relief through the desegregation litigation or by appealing to state and
local government initiatives, which meant that there was no political
process obstruction.20 1
The court, however, agreed with the plaintiffs that the legislative history
raised an issue of fact that the state had acted with discriminatory purpose in
enacting and enforcing the statute.2 02 Thus, it remanded the statute back to
the district court for trial to determine whether in light of the factors
identified by the United States Supreme Court in Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp.,203 the enactment and enforcement of the
statute against the MAS programs constituted intentional discrimination
against them on the basis of their race or national origin and, thus violated
their Equal Protection rights.204 If the kind of claim raised rested on statutes
or policies that did not discriminate on the basis of race on their face, but
instead had disproportionate impacts on members of a particular race,
Village of Arlington Heights directed courts to look at certain factors to
197. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
198. Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
199. Arce, 793 F.3d at 981 n.7.
200. See supra notes 39-42.
201. Arce, 793 F. 3d at 918 n.7.
202. Arce, 793 F. 3d at 977-81.
203. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-
66 (1997).
204. Arce, 793 F.3d. at 977-78.
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determine whether the statute or policy constituted intentional
discrimination.2 05 In this type of case, the Supreme Court had made clear,
challengers of governmental action had to prove discriminatory intent or
purpose.20 6 Arlington Heights made it clear that plaintiffs did not have to
prove that the discriminatory purpose was the only purpose, "but only that it
was a 'motivating factor,"' 207 and directed courts to consider the historical
background of the challenged decision, the specific sequence of events
leading up to the decision, departures from the normal procedures, and the
relevant legislative history. 208 The Arce court concluded that the statute,
although using race and ethnicity as defining characteristics, was the
equivalent of a facially neutral statute, and, thus, that the Arce plaintiffs
would have to prove discriminatory intent in order to prevail on their Equal
Protection claim.
Given the legislative history and the factual context in which the
Arizona statute was adopted and applied, it would appear likely that the
plaintiffs would prevail on remand, by convincing the lower court that the
Arizona statute was applied in a discriminatory manner against the Tucson
MAS program and that at the heart of the discriminatory treatment was
animus towards the MAS program because of its focus on Mexican
Americans as an ethnic or racial group.209 If this were actually likely,
however, it would be difficult to understand the original ruling finding that
as a matter of law, on summary judgment, the plaintiffs could not establish
that the targeting of the MAS program by statute raised a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the targeting of the MAS program made possible
by the ethnic studies statute violated the Equal Protection clause. Arguably,
under this thinking the statutes before the Brown court were not facially
discriminatory because they too applied to all races. This shows the
205. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-68 (some factors to be considered in determining
discriminatory purpose included impact of official action and whether it bears more heavily on one
race than another; historical background of the decision; specific sequence of events leading to the
challenged action; defendant's departures from normal procedures or substantive conclusions; and
relevant legislative or administrative history).
206. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (proof of racially discriminatory purpose or
intent is necessary for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause; disproportionate impact is relevant
as evidence of purpose but may not alone suffice to establish discriminatory intent).
207. Arce, 793 F. 3d at 977 (quoting from Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. 265-66).
208. Id.
209. While this article was in production, the district court decided the case and found that the
plaintiffs had established the requisite level of intent: That the Arizona defendants had acted with
invidious discriminatory intent towards the Tucson MAS program by enacting and implementing
the statute. Order and Opinion, Gonzalez v. Douglas, No. CV 10-623 TUC AWT (Aug. 22, 2017).
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importance of understanding why, in the view of the courts to engage the
question, the statute on its face does not violate the equality principle.
VII. Prohibiting Ethnic Studies as Facial Discrimination on the
Basis of Race or Ethnicity
Why does the statute's reference to "particular ethnic group" and
"ethnic solidarity" not constitute facial discrimination? It is important to
understand this because it suggests that the same statute passed without
animus and was implemented across the board to apply to all ethnic or racial
groups save Native Americans (statutorily exempted to the extent "required
to comply with federal law" and in so far as their treatment involved
genocide or their historical oppression) and Jews (in so far as the Holocaust
is concerned or again their historical oppression) has no constitutional
problem under the Equal Protection clause. The state could suppress or
prohibit classes designed for a particular ethnic or racial group if it advocates
ethnic solidarity. This approach to equality would prohibit school districts
from voluntarily attempting one of the few race conscious measures left
available to deal with highly racially segregated schools and student
populations often lacking in sufficient resources to enrich and adequately
supplement their public education. This kind of statutory measure attempts
to ensure that the white supremacy principle formally at work in the pre-
Brown world continues unabated in the twenty-first century. Thus, even the
Ninth Circuit's approach leaves one of the few available mechanisms to
respond effectively to the lack of actual diversity in public education at risk;
one of the tools left available for schools to help their students understand
and work with the diversity that is a defining characteristic of the global
order and humanity is declared forbidden territory by the Arizona statute.
The Ninth Circuit concluded that because the statute applied to all
ethnic backgrounds, not just ethnic minorities, it did not constitute facial
discrimination on the basis of race or ethnicity. 210 The court's thinking
appears to reflect a view of race similar to that rejected by the U.S. Supreme
Court in cases such as Loving v. Virginia, in which the state of Virginia
argued that a statute prohibiting interracial marriage did not constitute
discrimination on the basis of race because all races were similarly
affected. 2 11 The Ninth Circuit's thinking on the issue took up a paragraph
210. See supra Section VI.
211. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1967) ("[W]e reject the notion that the mere "equal
application" of a statute containing racial classifications is enough to remove the classifications
from the Fourteenth Amendment's proscription of all invidious racial discriminations.").
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but the reasoning underlying its conclusion is not so easily discerned. The
modern view of the Equal Protection Clause is that classifications defined by
race or ethnicity on the face of the statute are facially discriminatory and thus
subject to strict scrutiny. Schuette marked a departure from this approach
but Schuette lacked a majority opinion, instead presenting a badly splintered
Court, and involved a ban on affirmative action, not a ban on curricular
choices. 212 Moreover, Schuette rests on a challenge based on the "political
process" cases, an argument that a majority of voters had acted to make "it
more difficult for a traditionally excluded group to work through the existing
process to seek beneficial policies."213
Is the problem that the prohibition was couched in "hate speech"
language? The statute prohibits promotion of racial hatred and resentment,
so that it evokes the kind of prohibition that might have been directed at
KKK groups espousing white supremacy language and hate speech towards
racial minorities. Former state superintendent Horne, and former state
superintendent Huppenthal in a series of blogs, and in testimony at trial,
made it clear that they thought the Tucson MAS program was teaching
students to hate whites.214
The statute exempts courses that include the history of any ethnic group
open to all students, but only to the extent that they don't promote resentment
toward a race, are not designed primarily for pupils of a particular ethnic
group (even if open to all students) and again, do not advocate ethnic
solidarity. The statute's attempt to avoid facial unconstitutionality renders it
irrational: learning that one's own history may have accommodated genocide
and violent oppression of members of certain racial and ethnic groups may
lead to repentance and enlightenment, but it may also lead to resentment and
denial. Critical learning and thinking may engage a full gamut of emotions
and responses in all racial and ethnic groupings; the Equal Protection clause
prohibits constitutionally sheltering the white, Eurocentric racial group at the
expense of all others. This is what the Arizona statute attempts to do.
The statute makes solidarity a positive evil when it rests on ethnicity
(race). But solidarity is more likely identified as resting on or producing
respect for individuals. The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines solidarity
as "a feeling of unity between people who have the same interests, goals,
etc.; unity (as of a group or class) that produces or is based on community of
212. See supra notes 39-45.
213. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. at 1671 (2014) (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting).
214. Order and Opinion, supra note 209 at 5-15, 22-25, 29-32.
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interests, objectives, and standards."215 Solidarity is a concept often used in
religious thinking and practice. For example, Catholic Social Teaching
thinks of solidarity as being at one with respecting the individual: "Solidarity
is about valuing our fellow human beings and respecting who they are as
individuals."2 16 The statute's positing of ethnic solidarity (and implicitly
classes defined by race or ethnicity) as being in opposition to the individual
violates the principle at the heart of equality. Equality is relevant only when
there is difference. One can be equal only in comparison to something else.
The Arizona statute, read as a whole, is an attack on Equal Protection law
and the equality principle.
Statutes that prohibit on their face the use of curricular content or
pedagogy that reflects racial or ethnic consciousness, like the Arizona statute
prohibiting ethnic studies, merit strict scrutiny because they prohibit
formation and exploration of self and group racial or ethnic identity. They
assume that the dominant historical narrative is neutral and objective and
deny the function of race, ethnicity, and gender in that narrative. They also
prohibit challenges to established racial and ethnic orthodoxies, and enshrine
those orthodoxies as the only acceptable racial and ethnic perspective
through which to explore and study content. They reflect fear that
acknowledging cultural and ethnic differences will inevitably lead to ethnic
and racial conflict and racism. The motivation behind such a prohibition is
likely to be invidious since it seeks to shut down or prevent exploration of
one's ethnic or group identity in the context of a society where that ethnic or
racial identity defines them as a practical matter. Such a prohibition flies in
the face of the recognition that diversity-racial and ethnic diversity-is
valuable and constitutes a compelling state interest in the context of public
education as a majority of the Supreme Court recognized in the Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District opinion.217
Conclusion
In a multiethnic, multiracial, multicultural society like the United
States, repression of ethnic group identity is unlikely to succeed as a
mechanism for creating unity. Increasing exposure to and interaction among
diverse ethnic groups may still be the best way to avoid racial or ethnic
tension. But in the public school context, integration may no longer be
215. Solidarity, MERRIAM WEBSTER (2017).
216. Seven Themes of Catholic Social Teaching, United States Conference of Catholic
Bishops, www.usccb.org/beliefs-and-teachings/what-we-believe/catholic-social-teaching.cfm.
217. Parents Involved in Cmty Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
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feasible given Supreme Court rulings, and in the Tucson context, public
schools are increasingly racially concentrated. 218 The legislative history of
the Arizona statute manifests that creating unity was not the actual goal of
the statute; the actual goal of the statute was preservation of the dominant
ethnic narrative. The 2016 presidential election reflects this basic conflict
between the views that difference, in particular racial ethnic or color
difference, must be silenced, and the view that difference, including racial,
ethnic or color difference, may be recognized and even celebrated.
Repression will only increase existing tension and hostility among ethnic
groups, including the majority white Euro-centric group. Repression leads
to victimization and alienation; celebration of difference, on the other hand,
may facilitate understanding and empowerment. These are old truths, not
new or original principles. We ignore them at our peril.
That there is no valid or legitimate reason, grounded in sound
educational objectives, to ban ethnic studies programs is in itself stark
evidence of such a ban's invidious nature. That empirical research supports
their use in accomplishing educational goals, including debunking of racial
stereotypes (something key to educating individuals in treating each other
like individuals), improving attendance, academic achievement, and
graduation rates is even starker proof that the bans are irrational.
Associate Justice Ruth B. Ginsburg recognized the value of celebrating
difference in a sex discrimination case: United States v. Virginia.219 In
declaring Virginia's males-only admission policy to its prestigious Virginia
Military Institute unconstitutional, Justice Ginsburg stated:
"Inherent differences" are no longer accepted as a ground for race or
national origin classifications ..... Inherent differences between men
and women, we have come to appreciate, remain cause for celebration,
but not for denigration of members of either sex or for artificial
constraints on an individual's opportunity.220
Humans, like all other species, are individually unique and uniquely
individual. Ethnic identity, like any other group-based identity, historically
218. Special Master's Annual Report for 2014-15, No. 4:74-cv-00090-DCB, D. Ariz. March
14, 2016, at 4 ("There are more racially concentrated schools (schools with more than 70% one
race) today than in 2011-12.").
219. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
220. Id. at 533.
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has been used to denigrate, repress, and target; better, instead, to use it as a
cause for celebration and as a way to maximize individual opportunity.
One of the most salutary effects of the Arizona experience has been a
resurgence of interest in ethnic or culturally relevant studies. Arizona's
targeting of the Tucson MAS program drew the attention of documentary
filmmakers who produced the award-winning Precious Knowledge:
Arizona's Battle over Ethnic Studies.221 More important to the future of such
programs, scholars and school districts, in particular school districts in
California and Texas, two states with significant ethnic populations,
reengaged in studying and developing such courses.2 22
Long before Arizona adopted its ethnic studies ban, scholars had come
to a consensus as to the importance of ethnic studies to education.
Interdisciplinary scholars convened to determine some essential principles
distilled from research and experience about education and diversity
concluded that national unity would be strengthened by respecting and
building upon "the cultural strengths and characteristics that students from
diverse groups bring to school."223 The essential principles addressed
teacher preparation and student learning, among other things. With regards
to teacher training, the report provided that programs should educate teachers
in "ways in which race, ethnicity, language, and social class interact to
influence student behavior. "224 With regards to student learning and
relations, the report concluded that "curriculum should help students
understand that knowledge is socially constructed," students should learn
about "stereotyping and other related biases that have negative effects on
racial and ethnic relations," and "about the values shared by virtually all
cultural groups (e.g., justice, equality, freedom, peace, compassion, and
charity)."2 25 Overall, the principles support the ethnic studies or "culturally
relevant" courses pedagogy and curriculum.
221. Precious Knowledge: Arizona's Battle over Ethnic Studies (Dos Vatos Productions
2011).
222. Cindy Carcamo, Interest in ethnic studies jump after Arizona ban, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 23,
2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/23/nation/la-na-ff-tucson-schools-20130324; J.
Weston Phippen, How One Law Banning Ethnic Studies Led to Its Rise, ATLANTIC (July 19, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.comleducation/archive/2015/07/how-one-law-banning-ethnic-studies-led-
to-rise/398885/.
223. James A. Banks et al., Diversity Within Unity: Essential Principles for Teaching and
Learning in a Multicultural Society, Center for Multicultural Education, College of Education,
UNIV. of WASH, SEATTLE (2001).
224. Id. at 5.
225. Id. at 8-9.
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Notwithstanding the support among education scholars for culturally
relevant education, few school districts in 2010 appeared to have been offering
ethnic studies courses. Arizona's ban, however, resulted in renewed vigor in
curricular offerings. San Francisco Unified School District, for example,
adopted a resolution to support ethnic studies in their schools.226 Arizona's
public schools appear to be committed to offering some culturally relevant
courses through the unitary plan process, but the MAS program at Tucson
High as it was known prior to the ethnic studies ban, is gone.227 Perhaps even
Arizona may reconsider its position: Its legislature recently rejected a bill that
would have expanded its ethnic-studies ban to university and community
college courses. 228 But for Arizona, the fact that its students did better with
the courses should have sufficed to ensure their continued viability.
In prohibiting ethnic or racial studies, Arizona apportioned a benefit on
its current statewide majority race, at the expense of its minority ethnic
identities and cultures (ironically in the context of the student population the
majority ethnic identity), and placed a special burden on them by denying
them the opportunity to access knowledge and understanding critical to the
forming of their individual and group identity and to participate fully in their
educational experience.
226. Allyson Tintiangco-Cubales et al., Toward an Ethnic Studies Pedagogy: Implications for
K-12 Schools from the Research, 47 URB. REV. 104 (2014).
227. Ironically, one of the problems identified in the unitary status plan negotiations was a
problem hiring teachers to teach culturally relevant courses. In the words of the Special Master:
"It appears that the reticence of teachers-which has been fueled by the opposition of the State to
the Courses, and, to some, extent, by community controversy-is dissipating." Report and
Recommendation of Special Master, No. 4:74-cv-00090-DCB, D. Ariz. (Apr. 20, 2016). The
Mendoza plaintiffs pushed to have the district found to be in noncompliance over its failure to hire
sufficient teachers, but ultimately the district court, on the recommendation of the special master,
decided not to.
228. Maria Polletta and Alia Bear Rau, Arizona Bill to Extend Ethnic-Studies Ban to
Universities Dies, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, (Jan. 17, 2017), http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/
arizona-education/2017/01/18/arizona-bill-extend-ethnic-studies-ban-universities-dies/96694610/;
Maria Polletta, Divisive or Empowering?: New Arizona Bill Extends Ethnic-Studies Ban to
Universities, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Jan. 15, 2017), http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/
arizona-education/2017/01/13/divisive-empowering-new-arizona-bill-would-extend-ethnic-
studies-ban-universities/96532726/.
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